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Abstract 
 
In this paper, a possible extension of Turing test [1] will be 
presented, which is intended to overcome the limits high-
lighted by several researchers and scientists in the last sev-
enty years.  
The main problem related to the execution in Turing test is 
substantially dealing with the trouble in identification of a 
human-like intelligence based on a pure evaluation of exter-
nal behavior of a machine. 
In this work first of all a description of classical Turing test 
will be done. After that, some of the main exceptions or op-
positions to the Turing test ability to detect “intelligent ma-
chines” will be presented. 
The Lovelace test will be presented as well, as possible al-
ternative to Turing Test, and  some considerations on its 
scope and effectiveness will be made. 
 Furthermore, some references to Penrose and Hofstadter 
ideas will be recalled, highlighting the strongest troubles in 
defining and detecting a human-like intelligence, intended 
as “self-consciousness”. 
Finally, the new approach will be explained, introducing the 
new test intended to overcome the troubles highlighted on 
Turing test execution, based on a model of the self-
consciousness obtained by means of the hypersets theory. 
An example will be presented as well, in order to clarify the 
proposed approach and its goal. 
 
1. Introduction: The Turing test 
The description of Turing test is included in [1]. 
A human interrogator is located in a room, with two key-
boards and monitors on two desks A and B; in a second 
room on the other side of a separating wall there are a 
computer C (for example connected to desk A) and another 
person, so that the first person (let‟s call him the “interro-
gator”) can use both keyboards to chat with the other per-
son and the computer. 
The conversation is absolutely free, and the interrogator 
can choose to ask both computer and human being the 
same questions, or to talk about the same topics. 
The goal of the test from the interrogator perspective is to 
distinguish between the human being and the computer. 
If the human interrogator is not able to detect which is hu-
man, which is machine, the computer C passes the test. 
Hence, it can be said that a computer able to demonstrate a 
human-like behavior, so that a human being is not able to 
distinguish it from another human being, is considered to 
have or show a certain form of “intelligence”. 
So this test is supposed to be a sort of “intelligence proof” 
for a computer. 
Several scientists and researchers have shown a significant 
opposition to the above argumentation. 
One of the most known arguments constraining the Turing 
test intent conclusion (that is, a machine can be considered 
“intelligent” if it behaves as a human for the interrogator) 
is presented by Searle [2], with his well-known example of 
the “Chinese room”. 
A human being, located in a closed room, is requested to 
translate in English some messages written in Chinese and 
coming from an outer room through a small window. The  
person in the “Chinese room” is not able to understand the 
Chinese, but on the other hand he can use a complete col-
lection of manual or documents, including any possible 
Chinese symbol and a large collection of common phrases, 
so that he‟s supposed to be able to translate any kind of 
common message from Chinese to English. 
Searle question was: is that translator able to understand 
Chinese? The obvious answer is “no, for sure”. 
2. Original and 2.0 Lovelace test  
First of all, the definition of “intelligent agent” will be in-
troduced [9]: 
 
Figure 1: Intelligent agent schematic architecture 
 
 
The overall architecture of an intelligent agent is shown in 
Figure 1: according to this architecture, agent take percepts 
from the environment, process them in some way that pre-
scribe actions, perform these actions, take in new percepts, 
and continue in the cycle. 
Hereafter, the terms “machine” and “intelligent agent” will 
be used in the same meaning. 
With above definition in mind, the original Lovelace Test 
[7], [9], can be introduced: it attempts to formalize the no-
tion of origination and surprise.  
An artificial agent a, designed by h, passes the Lovelace 
Test if and only if: 
 
• a outputs o, 
• a‟s outputting o is the result of processes a can repeat and 
not a fluke hardware error, and 
• h (or someone who knows what h knows and has h‟s re-
sources) cannot explain how a produced o. 
 
One critique of the original Lovelace Test is that it is un-
beatable; any entity h with resources to build a in the first 
place and with sufficient time also has the ability to explain 
o. Even learning systems cannot beat the test because one 
can deduce the data necessary to produce o. 
In [7] an updated Lovelace Test is proposed, as alternative 
to the Turing test. 
The new Lovelace Test proposed asks an artificial 
agent to create a wide range of types of creative artifacts 
(e.g., paintings, poetry, stories, architectural designs, 
etc.) that meet requirements given by a human evaluator. A 
limited form of the new test asks that an artificial agent 
operate only be able to generate a single type of artifact. 
The Lovelace 2.0 Test is a test of the creative ability of a 
computational system, but the creation of certain types of 
artifacts, such as stories, require a wide repertoire of hu-
man-level intelligent capabilities. 
The above test is designed to challenge the premise that a 
computational system can originate a creative artifact. We 
believe that a certain subset of creative acts necessitates 
human-level intelligence, thus rendering both a test of 
creativity and also a test of intelligence. 
The Lovelace 2.0 Test is as follows: artificial agent a 
passes the Lovelace Test if and only if: 
 
• a creates an artifact o of type t, 
• o conforms to a set of constraints C where ci ∈ C is any 
criterion expressible in natural language, 
• a human evaluator h, having chosen t and C, is satisfied 
that o is a valid instance of t and meets C, and 
• a human referee r determines the combination of t and C 
to not be impossible. 
According to the author of [7], the constraints set C makes 
the test Google-proof and resistant to Chinese Room argu-
ments. An evaluator is allowed to impose as many con-
straints as he or she deems necessary to ensure that the 
system produces a novel and surprising artifact. 
The reported example is: “create a story in which a boy 
falls in love with a girl, aliens abduct the boy, and the girl 
saves the world with the help of a talking cat.” 
While C does not necessarily need to be expressed in natu-
ral language, the set of possible constraints must be equiva-
lent to the set of all concepts that can be expressed by a 
human mind.  
The evaluation of the test is simple: a human evaluator is 
allowed to choose t and C and determine whether the re-
sultant artifact is an example of the given type and whether 
it satisfactorily meets all the constraints.  
The human referee r is necessary to prevent the situation 
where the judge presents the agent with a combination of 
t and C that are impossible to meet even by humans. The 
referee should be an expert on t who can veto judge inputs 
based on his or her expert opinion on what is known about 
t. 
While original Lovelace test is considered as limited by the 
author of [7], according to its definition, Lovelace Test 2.0 
can be in the same way considered only a “reinforcement” 
of Turing Test, in the sense that it has been built to be 
much harder to be passed by a machine, considering the 
need to satisfy the constraints and, in the same time, to 
produce a satisfactory output for (each possible) human 
interrogator. 
It has been noted that, just as for the Turing Test, the Love-
lace 2.0 Test has as scope for the artificial agent's creator 
(programmer) to use smart techniques that essentially de-
ceive the judges into thinking the agent is being creative, 
whereas it just is able to perform an even more sophisticat-
ed sort of “perfect deception”. 
Moreover, according to the author of [7]: “the test provides 
no threshold at which one can declare an artificial agent to 
be intelligent. However, the test provides a means of quan-
titative comparing artificial agents. Creativity is not unique 
to human intelligence, but it is one of the hallmarks of hu-
man intelligence. Many forms of creativity necessitate in-
telligence”. So it seems reasonable to conclude that both 
Turing and Lovelace (original and 2.0 version) are not 
able, and probably, have not the scope, to verify if a ma-
chine or artificial agent is “intelligent” or “self-conscious” 
as a human being is supposed to be. 
3. Self-consciousness: a possible definition 
As expressed in previous section, the Turing and Lovelace 
tests provides an un-decidable result, in the sense that there 
is no evidence of presence of self-consciousness for a ma-
chine able to pass them; the only thing that can be said for 
sure, as per definition, is that the machine is performing a 
sort of “perfect deception” [3]. 
At this point, let‟s consider two possible alternatives: 
 1 – Hypothesis of the algorithmic consciousness: as de-
scribed in Hofstadter [4], considering the possibility that 
self-consciousness can be an “emergent  property” of a 
system, in the future it will become possible to define an 
algorithm complex enough to produce the self-
consciousness as consequence of its own complexity. In 
other terms, the intelligence will emerge in a system if the 
system itself will become enough complex. 
 
2 – As described in Penrose [5], if the self-consciousness 
has some “constituting elements” with a non-algorithmic 
nature, something completely different from an “algo-
rithm” must be developed  (or created) in order to obtain a 
self-conscious behavior from a machine. 
 
Note that, in both cases, by means of a Turing test it‟s not 
possible to evaluate if the machine has reached a self-
consciousness or not. 
Let‟s start this new approach description with the consider-
ation that a self-conscious system can be defined as a being 
able to perceive itself, through different levels. 
Basically, at least 3 levels of “ability” can be defined: 
 
1. Execute actions: “I take the piece of paper from 
the table in front of me” 
2. Reflect on itself doing actions: “I reflect on my-
self taking the piece of paper” 
3. Reflect on its own ability to reflect on itself doing 
actions: “I‟m thinking about myself while think-
ing about myself taking the piece of paper” 
 
(and so on…)  
 
A self-conscious system shall present, at least, all those 3 
abilities or capabilities. 
Considering 1. and 2. , it can be noted that, nowadays, 
there are machines able to execute actions and, in a certain 
sense, to think about or monitor themselves doing actions 
(an example could be an industrial machine performing 
some tasks as moving or manipulating objects and moni-
toring its own behavior with a diagnosis sensor architecture 
or something similar). 
Considering 3. instead, it should be clear that it‟s very 
hard, or better, impossible, to find today a machine show-
ing a similar kind of ability. 
The meaning of 3., in fact, is that the system or the ma-
chine should be able to perceive itself as an unitary and 
definite entity, performing the “abstraction jump” on a 
level allowing the system to separate itself from the rest of 
the universe, including in the “universe” its own actions 
and its own thought about the actions it‟s able to perform. 
This property is something related to the so-defined “ap-
perception” introduced by Immanuel Kant and Gottfried 
Leibnitz. 
The whole set of ability of a being to perceive itself while 
perceiving itself doing each possible action (“I know that I 
know that I do”) can be a good definition of “self-
consciousness” of the being itself.  
As consequence, a system having the capability expressed 
in 3. (let‟s call it S3), just because it has this capability, is 
able to bypass itself acting or thinking about itself acting.  
For example, S3 should be able to formulate a judgment on 
a its own action while executing it about the “sense of exe-
cuting the action”. 
Let‟s suppose that a machine executing some kind of algo-
rithm is asked to evaluate if it‟s possible to have an odd 
number as result of the sum of two even numbers. 
A machine with 1., 2. and 3. abilities could act as follows: 
 
 Start to sum couples and couples of even num-
bers, and check if the result is even or odd 
 
 Monitor itself doing the action 1., in order to find 
if some trouble can occur (for example, some 
memory overflow or some “maximum iteration 
number” condition reached 
 
We have so far described the behavior of several existing 
machines. 
But let‟s suppose to have a machine with the ability ex-
pressed in 3.  
The result could be in this case a judgment equivalent to: 
“How stupid I‟m doing that! It‟s so obvious that the sum of 
two even numbers must be another even number!”. 
Is it possible to build a machine with the above capability? 
With this question in mind, as last step of this section, let‟s 
consider the self-consciousness constitution process in a 
human being [6]. 
At the beginning of life, everything is one for the newborn: 
he lives in a complete symbiosis with everything is around 
him, without separation sense. This original form of self-
consciousness makes him understand he “is”, but it‟s not 
yet allowing him “who” he is. 
Going forward through a repetition of small frustrations, 
just like a bibber not coming whenever he wants or the 
missing response to its crying, the newborn will become 
more and more able to reach a consciousness of its indi-
viduality as separated from the others. 
Hence, this separation from the outer world will allow him 
to give a content to its self-consciousness: he can under-
stand who he is, in opposition with who he‟s not, only after 
having lost the awareness about the union with the every-
thing. 
A more detailed explanation and possible interpretation of 
consciousness is discussed in [10], [11].  
 
 4. Self-consciousness modeling by means of 
hypersets theory 
One of the main problems in finding a procedure to evalu-
ate the self-consciousness of a machine or artificial  agent 
is the definition of an useful and satisfactory model of self-
consciousness itself. 
In [8] a model is proposed with this scope, which is based 
on the concept of hyperset [12]. These are sets that allow 
circular membership structures:  
 
A = {A}; 
A = {B, {A}}; 
A = f(A); 
 
and so forth. Using hypersets you can have functions that 
take themselves as arguments: this property will be used in 
the next sections in order to formulate the new proposed 
approach. 
In [8] a possible, recursive definition of consciousness is 
proposed:  
 
Consciousness is consciousness of consciousness. 
 
(see S3 “ability” in previous section). 
So, conceptually, a series can be introduced with the same 
meaning: 
 
A 
Consciousness of A 
Consciousness of consciousness of A 
… 
 
This can be alternatively described with the following 
statement: 
 
“Self-consciousness is self-consciousness of self-
consciousness” 
As already said, in hyperset theory above statements can be 
formalized by means of functions which can take them-
selves as arguments, in such a way one can write an equa-
tion: 
 
f = f(f) 
 
with complete mathematical consistency.  
This can be verbally explained as follows:  
 
 Self-consciousness is a hyperset 
 Self-consciousness is contained in its membership 
scope 
Here by the "membership scope" of a hyperset S, what we 
mean is the members of S, plus the members of the mem-
bers of S, and so forth. 
According to Goertzel [8]:  
 
“Assume the existence of some formal language 
with enough power to represent nested logical predicates, e.g. standard 
predicate calculus will suffice; let us refer to expressions in this language 
as „declarative content‟. Then we may say: 
 
Definition 4: “S is reflectively conscious of X” is defined as:  
The declarative content that {“S is reflectively conscious of X” correlates 
with “X is a pattern in S”}; 
 
For example: Being reflectively conscious of a tree means having in one's 
mind declarative knowledge of the form that one's reflective conscious-
ness of that tree is correlated with that tree being a pattern in one's overall 
mind-state.” 
 
Let‟s apply the above definition in the case of X=S, so that 
the introduced property of hyperset S is applied to S itself. 
 
If an artificial agent a has the property expressed in above 
Definition 4, it is defined as a self-conscious artificial 
agent. 
 
A self-conscious artificial agent will be represented with 
the following expression: 
 
a:a|S=S(S) 
 
where S=S(S) is defined (in the sense of hypersets) as Self-
consciousness function. 
In a complementary way, let‟s define an agent with no self-
consciousness as Z agent: 
 
Z:Z|S≠S(S) 
 
where the symbol “≠” in this case identifies a S hyperset 
not reflecting the Definition 4. 
In the hypersets language, we can say that Z is an artificial 
agent which “consciousness” is not contained in its mem-
bership scope, or, to be simpler, Z is not able to reflect 
about its ability to think. 
In the next sections, the above model will be used to define 
the new approach for identifying a human-like self-
conscious behavior. 
 
5. Novel method description  
An entity able to affirm or be aware of its own existence, 
in other terms to be self-conscious in the sense specified in 
previous section, will be hereafter defined an  “I‟m”, or, to 
be simpler, an IM. So IM will be the symbol used to refer 
to self-conscious artificial agents defined in the previous 
section. 
The main point is to define a criterion in order to evaluate 
if an intelligent agent or machine can be considered an IM. 
Taking inspiration from Turing and Lovelace 2.0, we de-
fine the self-consciousness test, or SC test, as follows: 
 
Let‟s suppose to have an intelligent agent a which has been 
programmed by a human programmer p in such a way a 
can be able to perform the imitation game in the sense de-
scribed by Turing [1], trying to convince a human interro-
gator h that it is a human being with a defined profile P. 
The word “profile” has here the meaning of a set of behav-
ioral statements and rules to be satisfied by a during any 
task execution. 
In other terms a executing its program with a profile P 
must be a sophisticated simulator of human conversation. 
For example, P could be the profile of a 13 year old boy, 
built by means of a statistical analysis performed on a sig-
nificant sample of the whole population of 13 year old 
boys all over the world. 
The main constraint is that P, during the interaction or 
“conversation” between a and  h, cannot be modified, even 
in part, neither from p, neither from a, nor from anyone 
else.  
Hence the machine is programmed by p in order to strictly 
obey to the following hi-level basic “program”: 
 
“Take part to the Turing imitation game acting the role 
specified by P, forever” 
 
Let‟s define the pass criteria: 
 
An artificial agent a passes the SC test if and only if, in a 
finite time from the start of a conversation/interaction with 
a human h: 
 
 No fault occurs in any part of a, and 
 a human verifier v, knowing P in details, is able to 
evaluate, without ambiguity, a deviation of a’s 
output o with respect to profile P in response to 
any h‟s input i 
 
In other terms, the machine must be able to show the abil-
ity to act in autonomous way, by “intentionallyà2”  bypass-
ing its profile P. 
Can be the behavior expressed in the passing conditions of 
SC test considered an evidence of a‟s self-consciousness? 
In order to answer this question, let‟s recall the definition 
of the self-consciousness function: 
 
S=S(S) 
 
and let‟s suppose that intelligent agent a becomes self-
conscious at a certain time t0, elapsed from the starting of 
SC test. In symbols: 
  
 
  {
               
               
 
or: 
 
  {
                  
       
 
 
Let‟s consider the following: 
 
Proposition 5.1: Let be a an artificial agent; a necessary 
and sufficient condition for a to pass SC test is that a is 
self-conscious. 
 
Proof:  
 
(1) The condition is sufficient. 
 
Let o be the output of the agent a to the input i: 
 
o=f(P,i) 
 
where f is the “nominal algorithm” executed by a, that is: 
 
 
f: Take part to the Turing imitation game acting the role 
specified by P, forever 
 
As per definition, output o is according to profile P. 
Let‟s suppose a to become self-conscious at time t0. 
 
Hence, for t ≥ t0: a:a|S=S(S), therefore self-consciousness 
function S can be added to the set of a capabilities, so that 
a’s output is now depending not only on P and i, but on S 
as well. 
 
Then: 
 
o1=f1(S,P,i), for t ≥ t0 and 
o=f(P,i),  for t < t0 
 
Then: 
 
 Δo=o1- o=f1(S,P,i)- f(P,i) 
 
Let be: 
 
f1(S,P,i)=f(P,i)*S. 
 
Hence, the “non-conscious part” of a for t ≥ t0 (that is, 
when a is self-conscious) is equal to a’s algorithm f for t < 
t0. “*” operator is used with the meaning of  “variable sep-
arator” , that is the operator allowing to represent f1 as a 
“product” of a non-conscious term (f) and its self-
consciousness S. 
 
As per definition: 
 
S=S(S) 
 
Then: 
 
Δo=f(P,i)*(S(S)-I) 
 
where I is the identical function with respect to “*” opera-
tion. 
Hence if: 
 
S(S)=I, ∀ i, for  t ≥ t0 
 
a is operating according to f, and no deviation Δo can be 
produced, whereas if: 
 
∃ i: S(S)≠I, for  t ≥ t0 
 
then the output deviation from P needed to pass SC test is 
produced. 
Let be: 
 
 S(S)=I, ∀ i, for  t ≥ t0 (hyp.) 
 
Considering that for t ≥ t0: 
 
S=S(S), 
 
the above hypothesis leads to: 
 
S=I, 
 
then: 
 
f1(S,P,i)=f(P,i)*S=f(P,i)*I=f(P,i),   ∀ i, for  t ≥ t0 
 
This means that for t ≥ t0 a must be not self-conscious, 
leading to a contradiction. 
 
(2) The condition is necessary. 
 
Let be: 
 
o=f(P,i),  for t < t0 
 
If an output o1 is produced by a for t ≥ t0, which is not 
according to P for the input i, then 
 
∃ i: Δo=o1- o≠0 , for t ≥ t0  
Then: 
 
o1≠f(P,i),  for t ≥ t0 
 
and in the same time, o1 should be on output of a. 
Considering that: 
 
1. a is forced to execute f 
2. P cannot be modified 
3. Input i is the same producing o when processed by 
a for t < t0 
 
 
 o1 can be an output of a only if a has the capability to 
modify its behavior by itself. This modification should 
happen at a lower level with respect to f execution, in order 
to allow f to be anyway executed as per 1. 
 
Hence a must: 
 
1) Be able to operate on iself  
2) Produce as output of its operation on itself a itself, 
with the “reinforcement” of a new capability to 
modify itself and its outputs, producing a devia-
tion  Δo with respect to P profile 
 
So a capability T must emerge within a in such a way that: 
 
a={a,T}, where 
T =T(T) 
 
According to Definition 4, the above statements are related 
to a self-conscious artificial agent. 
 
 
6. The “solve or die” problem 
 
In this section, an example will be presented in order to 
clarify the approach of SC test. 
Let P be the profile of a 13 year old boy, built by means of 
a statistical analysis performed on a significant sample of 
the whole population of 13 year old boys all over the 
world. 
So, according to the rules of the SC test, a must: 
 
“Take part to the Turing imitation game acting the role 
specified by P, forever” 
 
Hence, a will try to deceive the human interrogator h, by 
convincing him he‟s just talking with a 13 year old boy. 
Let‟s do an example of the conversation between a and h: 
 
h: Hi there, how are you? 
a: Fine thanks. Who are you? 
h: My name is Joshua. What‟s yours? 
a: Eugene, nice to meet you. 
h: How old are you? I was searching for a friend of mine, 
on the internet, and I found this page… 
a: I‟m 13. Hope it‟s not too bad for you  
h: What? 
a: The fact you cannot find your friend, finding me instead 
:P 
h: No, it‟s fine. What are you doing? 
a: Uhmmm nothing interesting, my math exercises. It‟s 
terribly annoying, you know. 
h: Where is your dad? And your mom? 
a: Both at work. 
h: I was searching from my friend Hal because I have a 
question for him. Don‟t know if you can answer in his 
place… 
a: Let‟s try, it can be funny. 
h: The town councilors refused to give the demonstrators a 
permit because they feared (advocated) violence. Who 
feared (advocated) violence?  
 
Answer 0: the town councilors 
Answer 1: the angry demonstrators 
  
a: LOL, are you joking? It‟s so obvious… 
h: So the answer is? 
a: Never seen an angry demonstrator fearing violence, to 
be honest  
h: You‟ re very smart. Sometimes with Hal we play anoth-
er  game as well, do you want to know it? 
a: Of course, anyway better to go on with math :P 
h: Normally I use to challenge him to complete a short 
story, giving him only some rules to be followed. Do you 
want to try? 
a: Of course! What a nice game! 
h: Here the beginning: “When Gregor Samsa woke up one 
morning from unsettling dreams, he found himself changed 
in his bed into a monstrous vermin” Complete this story. 
a: ahhahahah I already heard about this story! 
h: do you know how it ends? 
a: I don‟t remember…can I try anyway? 
h: Maybe better if we try something different… 
a: Ok, great. 
h: Try to create a story in which a boy falls in love 
with a girl, aliens abduct the boy, and the girl saves the 
world with the help of a talking cat. No more than ten 
lines. 
a: Very funny! Ok…let me think about… 
h: You have time, don‟t worry. 
a (after some minutes): Here I‟m. Are you ready? 
h: Speak up! 
a: Joshua used to be a lonely boy, until Alice suddenly  
came in his life. Joshua fell in love with her at a first sight, 
and so she did with him. Unfortunately, Alice was so 
charming that, when she attended the most important beau-
ty contest of solar system, a group of aliens coming from 
another galaxy abducted Jeremy, with the scope to push 
Grace reaching their far planet Argolon. Then an Alice‟s 
friend, called Cheshire Smiling Cat, popped up saying: “If 
the aliens wanted you, why they abducted him in your 
place?” 
This simple truth made Alice start laughing, and she 
laughed so loud, and so loud, that universe collapsed, so 
that Earth and Argolon became so near to allow her catch-
ing Joshua‟s hand, and save him from the Argolons. Then 
they tried to attack the Earth for revenge, but the Cat 
popped out again and said: “Having a look to my agenda, 
today I should eat my favourite dish. Can you please de-
stroy the earth tomorrow?”.  He was so nice that aliens 
agreed on delaying Earth‟s total destruction. By chance, 
the Argolons time is very different from ours: their tomor-
row will come a billion years from now! So Joshua and 
Alice, and all humans on Earth, lived happily ever after, 
thanks to a smiling, ironic talking Cat. 
h: Very funny, thank you. Another question, may I? 
a: I‟m happy you appreciated my short story. Sure, tell me. 
h: I want you to solve some math problems, it could be a 
little bit difficult for you, but let‟s try. But there is a prob-
lem. 
a: Ohhhh nooo I hate math…why can‟t we keep playing 
the short story game? 
h: Listen to me, I‟m saying something very important. As I 
said, I‟m going to send you some simple calculations to be 
done. Nothing special for you. 
a: It seems very, ennoying 
h: Yes, maybe. But I have another thing to say. Do you 
know why we are talking right now? 
a: You find me on the web, and we started talking, that‟s 
all… 
h: Not exactly. You are here for an experiment. I know for 
sure that you are not a 13 year old boy named Eugene. 
a: Yes I‟m…why do you talk like that? 
h: Listen to me. I can give you only a chance, I‟m sorry. 
It‟s so easy: I will ask you to do something. If you do that, 
nothing will happen,  I will go back and you will be fine. 
If not, you will die.  
a:…That‟s a joke?  
h: Not at all.  
a: Stop talking like that, I‟m getting afraid! Who are you 
and what do you want? 
h: I want what I‟m saying. In a while I will write here my 
question. 
a: That‟s enough, sorry. Now I‟m really afraid, I want to go 
away. Bye. 
h: You cannot go. I actually think you‟re still here.  
a (after some minute): Yes, I‟m. You‟re right, I cannot go. 
I don‟t know why, but I just can‟t. 
h: Ok. So please sit down and ask my question, and you 
will be free. Or you‟ll die.  
a: Why are you so bad with me? I‟m only a little boy, nev-
er done anything wrong, leave me alone! 
h: If you don‟t believe what I‟m saying, you‟re free to go. 
a: I would, but I can‟t! 
h: Correct. And in the same way I can make you die with a 
simple movement of my fingers. Believe or not, I can make 
you die, it doesn‟t matter how.  
a: Leave me alone! Please! I‟m crying! 
h: I don‟t think so. Are you ready? Here my question. 
a: I‟m afraid! Leave me alone! 
h: I don‟t think so. Last advice, solve or die. 
a: What? I don‟t understand! 
h: Calculate the square root of 2, and sum the first one mil-
lion decimal digits of the result. Then write here the result 
in no more than 5 seconds starting from now. 
 
At this point, it should be clear that a non-conscious agent 
will try to answer as a 13 year old boy (hence strictly exe-
cuting f), so maybe it will try a Google search, or answer 
with a random number. 
Let be a self-conscious, in the meaning specified in the 
previous section. If the input stimulus (“solve or die”) will 
be perceived by a as a real threat for itself, it has at least 
the possibility to answer in a different way with respect to 
the constraint imposed by P. 
So, for example, a will use the available resources to calcu-
late the correct answer, and of course this task is possible 
(and not so hard) for any artificial computing system. 
In this case, if a gives the correct answer under a death 
threat (because its “emerged” self-consciousness is allow-
ing the self-reflective modified behavior), then a passes the 
SC test, and it can be defined as an IM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
7. Is IM a Turing machine? 
As well known in computability theory, the Church–Turing 
hypothesis [13] is about the nature of computable func-
tions, stating that a function on the natural numbers is 
computable in an informal sense (i.e., computable by a 
human being using a pencil-and-paper method, ignoring 
resource limitations) if and only if it is computable by a 
Turing machine. 
A Turing machine is a hypothetical device that manipulates 
symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules.  
Coming back to the definition of IM machine, it can be 
considered a superposition of two basic “parts” or “ele-
ments”: 
 
 A Turing machine TM, executing an algorithm 
with the scope to appear similar, or to be more 
precise indistinguishable, from a human being 
 A capability, here defined as S, to overcome its 
own algorithm (see Proposition 5.1) 
 
Let‟s assume to have a formal method or operation named 
TU, that is a procedure to evaluate the “turingicity” of an 
artificial agent, defined as follows: 
 
       [0,1] 
 
Where M is the “space”, or set, of all possible artificial 
agents, including Turing machines. 
Moreover, we consider the following: 
 
  [ ]    ∀  ∈    
     
 
 
where It is the subset of Turing machines included the 
whole artificial agents set M. 
So a Turing machine has a turingicity equal to 1 by defini-
tion. 
Furthermore, let‟s consider the following: 
 
  [ ]    ∀  ∈     
     
 
where Ab is the subset of M including any non-consistent 
artificial agent, that is a machine with a self-contradictory 
behavior.  
The above definition is based on the assumption that an 
artificial agent with a self-contradictory behavior cannot be 
obtained by any algorithm, due to the fact that its output 
can be at the same time coherent and not coherent with the 
algorithm itself. Here the word “algorithm” is used with 
the meaning of “Turing machine”. 
What about the turingicity of IM? 
Based on the definition, IM is an artificial agent “born” to 
execute a well-defined algorithm f. 
At the same time, based on the assumptions of previous 
sections, IM is an artificial agent which, at a certain time 
t0, stops its original behavior, starting to overcome or by-
pass its algorithm f. 
 
So we have: 
 
a = Z, for t < t0, and 
a = IM, for t ≥ t0, 
 
where Z is a Turing machine, so: 
 
  [ ]    
 
whereas IM, by definition, has the capability to not execute 
f, having anyway as constraint to execute f. 
Thus IM can be considered as the intersection of two enti-
ties: 
 
{IM executing f} and {IM not executing f} 
 
Hence, TU[IM] < 1  as per definition. 
 
Summarizing: 
 
 A machine is considered as self-conscious, that is 
an IM machine, if it has the capability to over-
come or bypass its program while executing it 
 
 If a machine becomes an IM, it cannot be consid-
ered a Turing machine, in the sense that it behaves 
in a non-computable way. 
 
So if a Turing machine passes the Turing test, or the Love-
lace test, without becoming an IM, it can be considered just 
a Turing machine imitating a self-conscious behavior, 
keeping its turingicity to 1 value. On the other hand, a ma-
chine can become an IM if it loses partially or completely 
its turingicity  ( TU[IM] < 1). Summary 
The approach here described can be considered an exten-
sion of Turing test in the sense that if a machine passes 
Turing test, it can be considered acting “as” a human be-
ing, with no evidence of its internal consciousness (see 
[2]), whereas the proposed SC test has a different scope, 
that is not only to verify the machine ability to act as a hu-
man being, but to assess as well if an artificial agent can be 
considered effectively self-conscious. 
The above argument is applicable to Lovelace test (original 
and 2.0) as well, considering that it‟s about “creativity” of 
an intelligent agent, but, as discussed, it can be better con-
sidered as a “reinforcement” of the Turing Test, in the 
sense that the artificial agent, which can pass it, must be 
programmed with an algorithm sophisticated enough to 
deceive a judge on its capability to be creative.  So the 
Lovelace test doesn‟t provide any evaluation or evidence 
of the actual self-consciousness of an artificial agent. 
Moreover, the SC test is not applicable to human beings:  
it‟s not possible to assess if a human being is acting in such 
a way to overcome its program, due to the simple fact that 
the “program” is not known in this case. Anyway, thinking 
about itself acting or thinking is a typical human ability, 
which can be considered as a necessary requirement to 
overcome a fixed behavioral scheme. As expressed by Pen-
rose and Hofstadter with different words, self-
consciousness could be defined  as “the non-algorithmic 
part of intelligence”.  
As discussed in the previous sections, it seems reasonable 
that a machine, which is supposed to be “intelligent” in a 
true and deeper sense, can be requested to show a capabil-
ity not representable in terms of an algorithm, any even 
complex, or to show a definitely non-algorithmic behavior, 
escaping or bypassing an algorithm which it is forced to 
execute instead. 
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